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Middle East – Topics & Arguments #09–2017
Drawing on Sukarieh and Tannock’s polit-
ical economy of youth approach, this 
paper explores how Syrian refugee youth 
is constituted in protracted displacement 
in Jordan. It investigates a juvenile popu-
lation often overlooked in Forced 
Migration Studies, disenfranchised rural 
Syrians, who fail to develop practices of 
youthfulness, yet in exile are subjected to 
alternative productions of youth by the 
aid sector. Depoliticized NGO youth pro-
gramming overlooks Syrians’ limited 
access to the labor market and higher 
education. While educational trainings 
aim to produce entrepreneurial and citi-
zen refugees, they ultimately contribute 
to the creation of timepass and precari-
ous lives. This research is grounded in 
2016/17 of ethnographic fieldwork with 
Syrian refugees in a border town in north-
ern Jordan.
Keywords: Syrian refugee crisis; Jordan; 
rural livelihoods; urban displacement; 
NGO youth politics; timepass
Introduction
Having “reeked of lives on hold”, is how 
Betts and Collier recently described refu-
gee existence in Zaatari camp, Jordan, 
evoking standard tropes of displacement-
induced waiting (viii). 
Yet, contrary to common depictions of 
refugees as immobilized and passive, I 
found young Syrian refugees in Mafraq, a 
Jordanian town a mere 10 miles away from 
the Syrian border, to be surprisingly busy 
with studying English, Quran and IT, sew-
ing and hairdressing courses, even a wed-
ding photography class. Offered by local 
churches and mosques as well as 
Jordanian and international NGOs, these 
programs kept my informants occupied 
on most days. As many of them lasted no 
longer than a week, young refugees would 
complete one course after another, 
exchanging information about upcoming 
educational offers with their peers on 
WhatsApp and accumulating official-look-
ing certificates, usually issued by humani-
tarian agencies themselves.
Yet, over time, I began to have my suspi-
cions about the ultimate value of so much 
bustle. As Jordan is not a signatory to the 
1951 Refugee Convention on refugees, 
Syrians in the country are subjected to the 
same labor migration regulations as other 
migrants. Limited access to the formal 
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labor market – restricted to low-skilled 
jobs and requiring work permits difficult 
to obtain – and to higher education makes 
it unlikely that young Syrians could put 
newly acquired skills to use in the near 
future (Lenner). As a Syrian woman jok-
ingly remarked to me: “We learn English 
so we can receive foreign [NGO] visitors.” 
The obvious mismatch between NGO pro-
gramming and young Syrians’ exclusion 
from the formal economy in Jordan led 
me to question both the humanitarians’ 
and young people’s motivations for 
engaging in what seemed like an endless 
loop of educational training of all sorts. In 
doing so, I rediscovered the “strangeness 
of improvement” of other people’s lives (Li 
3). Eventually, challenging NGOs’ youth 
politics made me reconsider the meaning 
of youth itself. In offering training explicitly 
advertised for young Syrians, what kind of 
youth did NGOs have in mind?
Conceptually, this paper draws inspiration 
from two bodies of literature. First, in 
investigating productions of youth, I rely 
on Sukarieh and Tannock’s political econ-
omy of youth approach. Instead of taking 
youth as given, I ask how youth as a social 
category is constituted. However, a politi-
cal economy of youth is not limited to an 
analysis of youngsters’ economic rela-
tions; rather, it brings into view how a com-
plex web of circumstances – economic, 
social, and cultural – transforms, or fails to 
transform, young people as an age cohort 
into youth. 
Second, to make sense of how Western 
NGOs produce Syrian youth as a humani-
tarian object which they can subsequently 
act upon, this research positions itself in 
the continuity of postcolonial critiques of 
development. Putting to use Foucault’s 
seminal concept of discourse as practice 
(cf. Hall), postcolonial scholars have inves-
tigated how institutionalised knowledge 
productions are imbued with power and 
have material effects. Demonstrating how 
Others are constituted as objects of 
knowledge that states can discipline and 
govern, (e.g. Bhabha; Hall; Said and many 
others), they have highlighted the embed-
dedness of cultural representations in his-
tories of colonialism, slavery and imperial-
ism. While this paper can only allude to 
the rich tradition of thought, it takes seri-
ously Spivak’s objection to postcolonial 
intellectuals’ ambitions to restore the sub-
alterns’ voice: while first-world critiques 
remain entangled in hegemonic ways of 
speaking, attempts at passing the mic to 
the working class, Indian women, and 
other marginalized people overlook the 
heterogeneous nature of these groups. 
Hence, this paper does not claim to juxta-
pose humanitarian endeavours with what 
young Syrian refugees really want. Rather, 
it brings to the fore longstanding histories 
of dispossession, while concerning itself 
with the ways in which young aid benefi-
ciaries are silenced through gendered 
and class-based violence, but also through 
humanitarian project design in exile.
When it comes to development interven-
tions, “the colonial notion of European 
superiority” lingers in the subdivision of 
the world into more or less developed 
countries; Western capitalist economies 
and consumer societies are held up as the 
universal ideal of humanity (Ziai 128). In 
this paper, I demonstrate how humanitar-
ian action attempts to forge neoliberal 
model refugees, overlooking the after-
effects of economic disenfranchisement in 
pre-war Syria and power differentials 
between Syrian refugees and aid workers 
in Jordan. This line of thought owes a 
great deal to Ferguson’s (The Anti-Politics) 
seminal study of rural development proj-
ects in Lesotho, where he resorts to 
Foucauldian discourse theory to demon-
strate the – often unforeseen - material 
consequences of development discourse. 
As NGOs and international organizations 
invent Lesotho as an isolated subsistence 
economy, ignoring its longstanding 
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embeddedness in regional economies 
and migration circuits, mismatched agri-
cultural schemes fall short of reducing 
poverty, leading to the expansion of state 
bureaucracy instead. Pursuing develop-
ment as a depoliticized project, interna-
tional organizations fail to account for 
existing power relations that shape 
Lesotho’s economy, overlooking the role 
of corrupt bureaucratic elites and painting 
an undifferentiated picture of the aid-
receiving people. Li points out a more fun-
damental “contradiction between differ-
ence and improvement” (14-5): While the 
development industry aims at ameliorat-
ing aid beneficiaries’ living conditions, 
making them more like us, it crucially 
depends on constituting them as less 
developed others in order to retain them 
as objects of interventions and, ultimately, 
justify its raison d’être. Aid beneficiaries 
are thus relegated to the “waiting room of 
history”, never quite developed enough to 
govern themselves (Chakrabarty 8). 
Finally, I paint a picture of the humanitar-
ian landscape in Mafraq, Jordan, not as a 
civil society alternative to neoliberal states, 
but rather as deeply embedded in market-
based logics. To this purpose, the expo-
nential growth of NGOs since the 1990s 
needs to be briefly situated within a wider 
transition towards “the neoliberal restruc-
turing of capitalism” (Hirsch 10). While 
neoliberalism refers to a macro-economic 
doctrine centered on private enterprise, 
free markets and a retraction of the wel-
fare state, it also entails blurring the very 
boundaries between the private and the 
public sector through the intrusion of 
“new, market-based techniques of gov-
ernment within the terrain of the state 
itself” (Ferguson, “The Uses of 
Neoliberalism” 172), including the out-
sourcing of social services to NGOs 
(Harvey). However, the shrinking of the 
state from within also comes with its inter-
nationalization, through an increasing reli-
ance on international financial markets 
and the expansion of international organi-
zations (Hirsch); hence, I found myself 
working for a European NGO in a Middle 
Eastern backwater. Yet NGOs usually con-
tinue to be contingent on funding from 
governmental agencies and on the legis-
lative and executive frameworks of states 
within which they operate. They also lack 
democratic structures on the inside and 
often fail to give a voice to those they 
claim to represent (Hirsch, “The State’s 
New Clothes”). Humanitarian engage-
ment of multinational companies, as in the 
form of philanthrocapitalism, is a more 
extreme example of how private sector 
actors pursue technocratic, top-down 
approaches to development based on 
business models (Wilson).
In the footsteps of Ferguson (The Anti-
Politics), I thus provide a case study of 
young Syrian refugees in the Jordanian 
province for whom pre-war dispossession 
and cross-border displacement in Jordan 
have rendered youthful lifestyles inacces-
sible. I go on to show how development 
discourse – particular representations of 
young Syrians – translates into concrete 
development practices: NGOs in Mafraq, 
Jordan, constitute young Syrian refugees 
as a lost generation, i.e. a humanitarian 
object worthy of intervention. Projecting 
Western models of adolescence upon 
them, they provide Syrian beneficiaries 
with a variety of learning opportunities. 
Yet, in striking contrast to widespread 
appreciations of Middle Eastern youth as 
political actors during the Arab Spring, 
Mafraq-based NGOs aim to produce an 
apolitical, entrepreneurial refugee youth, 
in line with wider neoliberal agendas. 
However, NGO youth programming in 
Mafraq does not achieve what it sets out 
to do: in the absence of long-term employ-
ment perspectives for young Syrians, 
NGO-channelled youth engagement 
becomes a sort of time pass, compensat-
ing for the lack of access to higher educa-
tion and dignified labor, while also 
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justifying NGOs’ ongoing engagement in 
the Syrian refugee crisis. Humanitarian 
actors also accidentally create new oppor-
tunities and spaces for becoming youth. 
Eventually, this leads us to reconsider the 
production of precarious lives for young 
people in the Middle East and beyond.
In doing so, I hope to help fill two concep-
tual gaps in Forced Migration and 
Development Studies. First, while there is 
a sizeable amount of research on children 
in conflict (e.g. Boyden and De Berry; Hart, 
Years of Conflict), the situation of dis-
placed adolescents has been understud-
ied (Chatty, “Researching Refugee Youth”). 
In particular, it is rarely asked how human-
itarian intervention forges certain types of 
refugee youth, notable exceptions being 
Fiddian-Qasmiyeh’s study of the role of 
transnational care for Sahrawi children in 
reproducing a nation-in-exile (e.g. Crivello 
and Fiddian-Qasmiyeh) and a desktop 
study on making citizens of returning refu-
gee youth in Angola (Auerbach). 
Second, recent studies on young Arabs 
tend to focus on the predicaments of 
urban middle-class youth, especially 
endemic graduate unemployment. 
Unable to secure economic livelihoods, 
many Arab men cannot afford to pay the 
considerable costs of marriage and hous-
ing (Singerman; Dhillion, Dyer and Yousef; 
Joseph; Brown et al.). As they fail to 
achieve markers of social adulthood, 
young men become stuck in a liminal state 
of waithood, somewhere between being 
children and grown-ups (Mulderig). Much 
has been said about this generation-in-
waiting’s transformative potential for 
social and political reforms and its role in 
the revolutions of the Arab Spring (e.g. 
Honwana), often with a special focus on 
youngsters’ creative use of social media 
for formulating new modes of civic 
engagement (Herrera). Yet, waithood is 
something that young people need to be 
able to afford – it requires certain resources, 
including parental support and educa-
tional capital. What about young rural, dis-
tinctively non-middle class populations 
prevented from becoming part of youth 
movements not only by virtue of living far 
away from major cities, but also because 
of their low level of education? 
This paper draws on one year of ethno-
graphic fieldwork in 2016 and a two-month 
follow-up study in summer 2017 in Mafraq, 
a mid-sized provincial town in the north of 
Jordan, as part of doctoral research on 
Syrian refugees’ mobilities and waiting 
experiences in exile. Since early 2012, 
Mafraq’s cityscape has been reshaped by 
the massive influx of Syrian refugees. 
While exact figures vary between 80,000 
(UNHCR) and 100,000 new Syrian inhabit-
ants (Mafraq Mayor Ahmed Hawamdeh, 
Personal Communication, April 2016), i.e. 
roughly 50 percent of Mafraq’s current 
population, this makes Mafraq one of the 
urban centers most affected by the refu-
gee influx (CARE).
Mafraq’s Lost Generation (in Hiding)
W.’s fate is symptomatic of many young 
Syrians in Mafraq. One night, she proudly 
produces a yellowed picture that shows 
her hiding in an olive grove, a shy teen-
ager in a formal school uniform – a stint in 
school she fondly recalls, but which ended 
too soon when, at the age of 15, she joined 
her large family to work in a chicken farm 
on the outskirts of Aleppo. In 2009, the 
family started coming to Mafraq and the 
nearby Jordan Valley regularly for work in 
agriculture. When the Syrian civil war 
broke out, the family moved to Jordan on 
a permanent basis, capitalizing on old 
employment networks to find – increas-
ingly scarce – work. When I first meet W., 
now in her early twenties, she spends 
most of her time confined to her parents’ 
flat, occasionally interrupted by weeks of 
hard labor in the field, usually in the com-
pany of her father and unmarried sisters. 
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Unsurprisingly, Mafraq’s refugee popula-
tion is very young. In a recent survey in 
Mafraq Governorate, CARE found that 50 
percent of Syrian respondents were under 
18. However, beyond their demographic 
significance, young Syrians have also 
been constituted as a prime object of 
humanitarian and media attention, more 
specifically, as a lost generation, an expres-
sion forged by international media (Brown; 
Latonero; Mednick; Paton; Sinjab; Yahia 
and Zreik, and many others). By way of 
illustration, a 16-year-old girl from 
Damascus, living in a refugee camp in the 
north of Iraq, is quoted as: “My adoles-
cence… Maybe it was taken” (Akaja). In a 
similar vein, a photo essay for CNN 
describes a married 15-year old Syrian girl 
with one child of her own as: “Marwa was 
a woman who had lost her childhood” 
(Patterson). This approach is also reflected 
in the UNHCR’s No Lost Generation initia-
tive, launched in 2013 and focusing on 
education and child protection. While 
childhood and adolescence seem to be 
somewhat confused in most reports, the 
loss at stake usually refers to obstacles to 
continuing one’s education and its conse-
quences, such as child labor and early 
marriage.Furthermore, young people are 
often presented as psychologically dam-
aged, traumatized, suffering from PTSD, 
etc.  
In my own volunteering work with Syrian 
children in Mafraq, I witnessed numerous 
NGO-led attempts at creating child-
friendly spaces, bringing back childhood, 
let children be children, etc., through 
activities thought to be appropriate for 
children, such as visits to the zoo, school 
camps and so on. Psychosocial support for 
children offered by local and international 
organizations also speaks to an under-
standing of Syrian youth as damaged.   
However, as if echoing foreign media and 
humanitarians’ obsession with young 
Syrian refugees’ loss of childhood and 
adolescence, being young did not seem 
to resonate with my Syrian informants in 
Mafraq. While designations such as bint 
(girl, young woman) and shāb (young 
man) are widely used, they are solely 
understood with regard to marital status, 
not age. Moreover, young Syrians in 
Mafraq fail to do what young people in 
Jordanian cities usually do: wearing fash-
ionable Western-style clothes (or at least 
moderate Islamic dress), attending univer-
sity and gathering in shopping malls and 
coffee shops. While they certainly use 
mobile phones to communicate with 
friends like young Jordanians do, they 
mostly employ them for staying in touch 
with relatives in Syria or abroad, as well as 
with aid agencies in town. 
 As time went by, I started to wonder what 
it meant to be young and displaced in a 
messy urban environment such as Mafraq, 
having my suspicions about appropriate 
analytical categories. While there were 
certainly a lot of young people around, is 
it possible that youth simply did not exist? 
 
To make sense of this apparent contradic-
tion, I suggest going back to Bayat’s 
(“Muslim Youth”) distinction between 
young persons as an age cohort and youth 
as a social category. The latter is conceived 
of as a modern urban phenomenon and 
distinguished by “youthfulness”, “a partic-
ular habitus, behavioral and cognitive dis-
positions that are associated with the fact 
of being “young” — that is, a distinct social 
location between childhood and adult-
hood, where the youngster experiences 
‘relative autonomy’” (Bayat, “Muslim 
Youth” 28; cf. Sukarieh and Tannock). In 
particular, being youth comes with “a 
greater tendency for experimentation, 
adventurism, idealism, autonomy, mobil-
ity, and change” (Bayat, “Muslim Youth” 
30). Access to education, free time activi-
ties, leisure mobility, and mixed-gender 
socializing are all formative experiences 
for experiencing youth. Moreover, for 
young people to turn into youth, they 
need to reclaim youthfulness. Yet, these 
claims are not realized via institutions and 
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organized social movements, but rather 
through the formation of “passive net-
works” (Bayat, “Muslim Youth” 31), e.g. via 
shared fashion styles, symbols and meet-
ing places, and exerting one’s presence in 
public. Perhaps unsurprisingly, according 
to this definition, most young Syrians in 
Mafraq have never been youth. Yet human-
itarian actors in Mafraq set up various edu-
cational programs, assuming that the cat-
egory of youth is meaningful to their 
beneficiaries. 
Humanitarians’ Quest for the Universal 
(White) Child
That NGOs in Mafraq seem to find Syrian 
youth everywhere is the result of a two-
fold misrepresentation: the humanitarian 
sector’s blindness towards non-Western 
models of childhood and adolescence, as 
well as its ignorance of a specific history of 
dispossession which has shaped rural 
Syrians’ access to youthfulness.
In truth, educating young people often 
presupposes an understanding of young-
sters as tabula rasa. Hart (“Saving chil-
dren”; Years of Conflict) and Chatty 
(“Palestinian Refugee Youth”) draw atten-
tion to prevailing Western models of child-
hood in child- and youth-focused human-
itarianism, retracing how children became 
objects of study and humanitarian con-
cern, from the earliest League of Nations’ 
Declaration of Children’s Rights (1924) 
until the seminal UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (1989). What pertains to 
my analysis is how humanitarian under-
standing of childhood and youth are 
informed by Piagetian models of develop-
mental stages, constituting them “as a 
phase of life that was special, carefree and 
distinct from adulthood” (Hart, “Saving 
children” 6). It is noteworthy, though, that 
the universalised and depoliticised view 
of young people which often character-
ises humanitarian intervention is symp-
tomatic of a wider process of dehistoriza-
tion and depoliticization of aid recipients 
(cf. Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine). 
This leaves little room for individual – and 
often conflicting – displacement narratives 
(Malkki). 
In Mafraq, there is plenty of evidence that 
the youth NGOs have in mind is modelled 
after Western models of adolescence, 
with extended schooling and no involve-
ment in (waged) labor. UNICEF’s Makani 
centers, but also a local church and other 
small NGOs in Mafraq, offer elementary 
education to younger and older children 
out of school. However, different outlooks 
of parents and educators often clash: 
when a local Save the Children learning 
center started to pay parents a small 
monthly amount, it created strong expec-
tations among Syrian parents to receive 
compenzation for their offspring’s school 
attendance. While many NGO workers, 
especially Western foreigners, were scan-
dalized, they failed to grasp a simple 
truth: that in Syrian families of rural back-
ground, minors have always constituted a 
valuable resource and contributed to the 
family income.
The dreams aid workers encourage stu-
dents to indulge in are equally telling. 
While volunteering with a small Western 
NGO’s informal education project, I heard 
teenagers being groomed to envision 
themselves as doctors, teachers and engi-
neers, regardless of their parents’ non-
existent financial and educational 
resources and structural obstacles to 
higher education in Jordan.
The unfitness of humanitarians’ conceptu-
alizations of youth for capturing Syrians’ 
life worlds led me to adopt a class lens: 
while NGO programs prepare young ben-
eficiaries for Western middle-class life 
models, they overlook the socioeconomic 
background of their target group. In par-
ticular, they fail to grasp that young Syrians’ 
survival mechanisms – including child 
labor and early marriage – cannot be 
attributed to displacement solely. Rather, 
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they have long been a part of rural house-
holds’ coping mechanisms based on the 
contribution of all family members, includ-
ing minors. The life story of my friend W., 
whom we encountered earlier in this 
paper, reveals that even before 2011, hard 
physical labor and little education, but 
also frequent circular cross-border mobil-
ity, were the norm, rather than the excep-
tion, for many young Syrians from the 
lower classes. 
While most academic and NGO research 
to this day explains displacement patterns 
during the Syrian civil war through tribal 
and family networks, I argue that what 
brought my informants to Mafraq are 
longstanding pre-war labor migration ties. 
Mostly small-scale farmers and recently 
sedentary Bedouins from remote rural 
areas in the Homs and Aleppo governor-
ates – regions with high rates of poverty 
and illiteracy –, they frequently engaged in 
short-term seasonal migration to work in 
agriculture and construction in the Bekaa 
Valley, Beirut and Mafraq before 2011. As 
in other regions in the Middle East, circular 
mobility helped to complement income 
from farming and keep precarious rural 
livelihoods afloat (cf. De Haas), insecure 
existences compounded by large-scale 
agricultural reform, and, more recently, 
neoliberal projects in Syria (Azmeh). Far 
from being cosmopolitan travellers, infor-
mants took part in highly circumscribed, 
translocal mobility schemes – as one 
Syrian woman put it, “Mafraq was the only 
place we knew in the world”.
Devoid of other resources – economic, 
social, and educational –  my informants’ 
ability to move and access menial employ-
ment networks in the Levant was thus their 
only asset (Van Hear). Seasonal labor 
migration was facilitated by open state 
borders, a phenomenon well documented 
for Syrian labor migrants in Lebanon 
(Chalcraft), but also labor-receiving coun-
tries’ migration policies (De Bel-Air). While 
Jordan depends on foreign labor for low-
skilled jobs in agriculture and the con-
struction sector, it also assures that their 
migrant workers’ stay remains temporary, 
by keeping them in legal limbo. Forced 
into irregularity, rural Syrians often moved 
under the radar of state authority and did 
not appear in regional migration statistics.
After 2011, when the Syrian Civil War 
pushed rural populations out of their 
regions of origin, entire village communi-
ties, often bound together by kinship ties, 
managed to capitalize on transnational 
connections previously established by 
some of its members, to seek refuge, 
employment and housing abroad. Syrians 
often left their villages of origin in a hurry 
when fleeing from the regime bombings, 
without further preparations or the time to 
gather their belongings. However, anec-
dotal evidence from Mafraq suggests that 
some Jordanian employers proactively 
reached out to former Syrian farm work-
ers, inviting them back on their lands.
When state borders eventually hardened, 
circular, menial migration patterns were 
disrupted, turning formerly mobile labor 
migrants into refugees. Hence, contrary to 
common humanitarian beliefs, low educa-
tional levels, child labor and early mar-
riage are not a direct result of becoming 
refugees, but have long been a feature of 
insecure lives in pre-war rural Syria. 
Economic pressure aside, deeply rooted 
survival strategies at least partly explain 
why Syrian refugees keep engaging in 
practices punishable by Jordanian law 
and despite manifold incentives by aid 
agencies to keep children in school and 
out of the labor and marriage market.
This said, precarious lifestyles that render 
youthful behavior in Bayat’s (“Muslim 
Youth”) sense almost impossible are exac-
erbated by cross-border displacement to 
Jordan. The threat of deportation to 
Jordanian refugee camps and even Syria 
for working without a proper permit 
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pushes men into invisibility, while fuelling 
child labor (Human Rights Watch). As I 
learned from my friend W., women and 
children as young as 10 years old, known 
to be less targeted by labor patrols, often 
work long hours in agriculture around 
Mafraq, earning as little as 5 JD (ca. 6 EUR) 
a day. During the agricultural season, W. 
and her sisters were picked up by a bus at 
4 am and did not return home until the 
late afternoon. The strenuous work – pick-
ing fruits on the field and sorting products 
into pallets, often in the blazing sun, 
rudely pushed forward by Egyptian fore-
men – would frequently make her teen-
age sister faint. In addition, although gov-
ernmental schools in Mafraq run double 
shifts, overall schooling rates for Syrian 
children are low. Many students drop out 
of education at an early age because they 
have to provide for their families (for boys) 
or because of widespread sexual harass-
ment (for girls), making them lose out on 
schooling as a formative experience for 
extending adolescence and establishing 
peer networks.  
 
Finally, the shortage of opportunities for 
youthful behavior is compounded by 
Mafraq’s missing metropolitan identity; 
despite its urban appearance, it is hardly 
a real city at all. Given the lack of public 
facilities and its tight-knit tribal society, 
people’s lives take place behind closed 
doors and in the company of family mem-
bers. 
A comparison with Proudfoot’s research 
on Syrian rebel-workers in Lebanon 
sheds further light on my informants’ fail-
ure to develop a youthful habitus. Before 
2011, Proudfoot’s young rural informants 
sought work in construction and restau-
rants in Beirut to generate remittances for 
families back home, while simultaneously 
acquiring a degree from a local Lebanese 
university. Yet, they also eagerly adopted 
a Beiruti cosmopolitan identity, showing 
off (fake) Western-style clothes, exercis-
ing, and dating Lebanese women. When 
the Syrian civil war broke out, they took a 
pro-active stance in the conflict and, for 
some of them, even joined the fight back 
home. 
Their attempts at being visible in Beirut’s 
public life, as well as their later mobiliza-
tion in the Syrian civil war, are reminiscent 
of Bayat’s description of youth move-
ments, formed on the basis of shared 
consumption patterns and leisure time 
activities, ultimately through the mere “art 
of presence” (Bayat, “Politics” 125), in 
public space. 
Naturally, my informants’ lives in Mafraq 
differ greatly from these successful 
attempts at youthfulness and political 
mobilization. While having migrated as 
part of family units severely limits their 
freedom of movement, economic pres-
sure, Jordanian labor patrols and the 
extremely conservative, tribal and gender-
segregated environment in Mafraq make 
it impossible for young Syrians to exert 
their presence in public or socialize with 
people their age outside their immediate 
family, preconditions to becoming youth. 
Superwomen, Start-Up Entrepreneurs 
and Good Citizens – Producing Humani-
tarian Fantasies 
Nine months into our friendship, W. asks 
me to visit her at an NGO course on 
removing landmines. Previously, I have 
come to know her as a conservative young 
woman who wears the face veil and does 
not take taxis on her own for fear of inter-
acting with strangers. Yet, to my great sur-
prise, I now watch her chat freely with the 
male Jordanian instructor. Some days 
later, she spreads out the newly obtained 
certificates on the carpet in her parents’ 
living room, proudly handing me one after 
the other. Her enthusiasm is moving, 
reminding me of the earnest look on the 
school girl’s face in her sole childhood pic-
ture. W., who has never worked outside 
the family network, suddenly dreams 
about working for an NGO and contribut-
ing to Syria’s reconstruction after the war.
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While long at the margins of humanitarian 
attention – the UNHCR office in Mafraq 
only opened in 2014, while Syrian refu-
gees started arriving as early as January 
2012 – Mafraq has slowly emerged as a 
provincial humanitarian hub. In the initial 
absence of inter-agency cooperation, 
numerous aid agencies, including faith-
based charities, often replicate existing 
services, creating rifts within the refugee 
community while also distorting local 
economies through untargeted donations 
(cf. Dickinson). Given that most Syrians do 
not work on a regular basis, they heavily 
rely on aid supplies, but also spend much 
of their free time taking part in NGO 
classes. Financial compenzation for food 
and transportation is another strong 
incentive for signing up for these classes. 
As A., a Syrian university student in his 
mid-twenties, explains to me, he earns 
about 250 JD (ca. 302 EUR) a month as a 
volunteer with various organizations, 
enabling him to pay the rent for his entire 
family – fifty JD more than he gained work-
ing up to sixteen hours a day in a local 
supermarket.
However, what I am concerned with in the 
last part of this paper goes beyond the 
immediate economic benefits of NGO 
engagement for young Syrians. In the 
introduction, I outlined how NGOs’ depen-
dence on state funding and legal frame-
works, as well as the professionalization of 
aid, make it more difficult to present them 
as a morally superior civil society alterna-
tive to retreating welfare states. Another 
aspect of the intertwinement of humani-
tarian and neoliberal agendas is the 
latter’s often-overlooked role in shaping 
the way we perceive everyday reality 
and ourselves. Ferguson (“The Uses of 
Neoliberalism”) reminds us that in the 
Foucauldian sense, neoliberalism also 
refers to “techniques of government that 
work through the creation of responsibil-
ized citizen-subjects” – the production of 
the rational homo economicus, carefully 
weighing risks and operating “as a minia-
ture firm” (172). In other words, neoliberal 
capitalism as a hegemonic mode of dis-
course also produces certain subjectivi-
ties, or, in McGuigan’s words, “neoliberal 
selfhoods” (224). As examples, he quotes 
“successful entrepreneurs”, “youthful bil-
lionaires” and “celebrities”. A priori, young 
destitute refugees seem to be cast out 
from the neoliberal charade, being pre-
vented from spending, building careers 
and individualized lifestyles. Still, I argue 
that NGO youth politics in Mafraq are a 
prime battlefield for turning disenfran-
chised non-youthful youngsters into 
model refugees of a certain kind, i.e. a 
neoliberal refugee youth.
Importantly, Syrian refugee women play a 
significant role in these educational pro-
grams. Gender equality has been main-
streamed in humanitarian action for the 
last 20 years, branding refugee men as 
pre-modern perpetrators of domestic vio-
lence, powerful gatekeepers within the 
refugee community or emasculated trou-
blemakers (Olivius, “Displacing Equality?”; 
“Refugeemen”).
At the same time, humanitarian programs 
obey neoliberal governmentalities, more 
focused on heightening interventions’ effi-
ciency than tackling underlying power 
relations and structural inequalities. 
Following this logic, displaced women are 
co-opted into aid programs because they 
are considered better refugees, i.e. more 
family-oriented, cooperative, and reliable 
than men. 
In my own fieldwork, I witnessed many 
NGOs, both international and local, court-
ing female refugees. Many training pro-
grams specifically target young Syrian 
women by offering traditionally female 
skills such as tailoring, hairdressing and 
cooking, or requiring participation on a 
daily basis that working men cannot com-
mit to. While this reflects the reality of 
numerous female-headed households in 
Mafraq, it overlooks culturally specific divi-
sions of labor and structural inequalities 
that Syrian men are subjected to, including 
Middle East – Topics & Arguments #09–2017
FOCUS 116
heightened security checks, exploitative 
labor and deportation threats. In plain 
words, refugee women are turned into 
micro-level entrepreneurs able to procure 
for themselves and their families, as evi-
denced by numerous home-based work 
programs for refugee women and the pro-
vision of working equipment.  
By way of illustration, my friend W. was 
once given a hairdryer by a European 
NGO. Yet, while W. eagerly indulged in 
daydreams of new career prospects, she 
lacked both the vocational skills and a 
proper work permit to find employment in 
a local hair salon. Moreover, the limited 
surface of her family’s apartment hardly 
offered any space to start a business of her 
own - a difficulty compounded by severe 
gender restrictions prohibitive to house 
visits of female clients. Hence, although a 
well-meant gift, a hairdryer did not make 
a professional hairdresser yet. 
Moreover, NGO training funded by 
Western countries often seems to reflect 
donor interests more than the situation of 
refugees in the Levant. In late summer 
2016, a German political foundation came 
to Mafraq for a one-day crash course on 
democratic institutions. A mixed group of 
two dozen young Syrians, with educa-
tional levels anywhere between primary 
school and university education, eagerly 
engaged in heated debates, guided by 
highly motivated Syrian trainers their age. 
Yet there was a striking mismatch between 
participants’ goodwill and opportunities 
for political participation in Jordan, let 
alone Syria. This led me to question the 
value of citizenship as a concept in devel-
opment work: reclaiming refugee integra-
tion makes little sense when even 
Jordanian citizens lack civil and political 
rights. Against this backdrop, NGO pro-
gramming seemed to reflect ongoing 
debates about civil society inclusion of 
Syrian refugees at the municipal level in 
Germany, i.e. in a radically dissimilar pol-
icy environment (for an example of com-
parable workshops with refugees in 
Germany see Tribowski) – a prime exam-
ple of how even political education can 
become depoliticized. 
Finally, while an emancipatory effect of 
NGO trainings in Mafraq cannot be 
denied, it needs to be contextualized as 
part of a neoliberal endeavor to create 
highly mobile (preferably female) sub-
jects. However, NGOs and Syrian recipi-
ents often have different understandings 
of proximity and reasonable distance, a 
case in point of how well-meant humani-
tarian interventions overlook existing 
restrictions on female mobility in public 
space. For example, the Western NGO I 
volunteered with offered English courses 
outside the city center, encouraging 
young Syrian women to venture out on 
their own. Sadly, the initiative backfired, 
with numerous participants dropping out 
of the course because of the distance per-
ceived as unwalkable. 
Still, it cannot be denied that getting 
involved in humanitarian work does have 
the potential to increase Syrian women’s 
range of movement, both in the literal and 
the figurative sense (cf. Chick, for refugee 
women in Lebanon). In fact, many young 
Syrians in Mafraq appreciate opportuni-
ties for rare mixed-gender sociability 
within NGO facilities, often rendered toler-
able to watchful parents by the prospect 
of additional humanitarian assistance. My 
friend W. found it acceptable to take off 
her face veil and interact with male volun-
teers in the office of a local NGO she often 
visited for training, and even for mere 
hanging out with fellow students. Over 
time, her younger sisters and even her 
parents began to regularly join her at the 
premises, building a close relationship 
between the family and the NGO’s 
Jordanian director. Moreover, volunteer-
ing with charities presents a rare occasion 
for mingling with local youth. As A., the 
student mentioned above, highlights, 
Syrian-Jordanian friendships forged in 
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NGO offices often lead to mutual visits 
and shared leisure activities, such as bar-
becues, visits to coffee shops and the gym 
– all of them reserved for men.
Sadly, in the end, NGO courses are often 
no more than a short, pleasant interlude 
before marriage and childcare take their 
toll. When I visit W. in summer 2017, she 
has become the second wife of an older 
Syrian from Raqqa, himself a migrant 
worker in Jordan before the war. Newly 
pregnant and locked into her husband’s 
tiny apartment in Maʿan, a highly conser-
vative town in the south of Jordan, she is 
terribly bored and greatly misses her reg-
ular visits to the Jordanian NGO center in 
Mafraq. 
Conclusion: Aborted Neoliberal Subjec-
tivities and Timepass
This article set off by countering common 
representations of refugees as being stuck 
in space and in their lives, portraying the 
manifold NGO-led activities provided to 
young Syrian refugees in Mafraq, a result 
of the presence of multiple aid agencies 
on the ground. Taking Ferguson’s (The 
Anti-Politics) critique of the humanitarian 
“anti-politics machine” as a blueprint for 
my own analysis, it demonstrated how 
NGOs constitute young Syrians as human-
itarian objects, subsequently carving out 
spaces and opportunities for youthful 
behavior for a population of youngsters 
who, due to longstanding disenfranchise-
ment at home and in Jordan, have never 
really been young before. Still, due to 
restrictive migrant labor regimes in 
Jordan, they ultimately fail to produce 
young entrepreneurs, good citizens and 
independent women, i.e. the apolitical 
neoliberal subjectivities humanitarians 
have in mind.
On a final note, the mixed success of NGO 
youth programs in Mafraq invites more 
general reflections about the type of wait-
ing marginalized youth find themselves in. 
Comparative evidence comes from 
Jeffrey’s study of lower middle-class men 
in northern India who have the resources 
to acquire higher education, but lack the 
social capital to find matching jobs. In the 
meantime, they keep accumulating – 
eventually useless – university diplomas, 
while also developing “timepass cultures” 
of their own, such as exerting their pres-
ence in the public sphere through per-
forming hyper-masculinities (Jeffrey 475). 
Notwithstanding their potential for bring-
ing about political reform and innovative 
lifestyles, timepass, in the end, “was what 
one had to do because more meaningful 
ways of engaging with the world were 
unavailable” (Jeffrey 471). It seems all too 
easy to draw parallels to the situation of 
young Syrians in Mafraq who, despite 
amassing home-made NGO certificates, 
keep being excluded from the formal 
labor market and higher education. That 
they fail to make themselves visible on 
Mafraq’s streets, instead preferring to go 
unnoticed, can be ascribed to the legal 
limbo and deportation threat they find 
themselves in. 
Yet, while failing to yield ideal-typical neo-
liberal subjectivities, the aid sector unin-
tentionally reproduces a youth experience 
characteristic of the globalized world in 
which flexible labor markets demand eas-
ily disposable workforces. Thus, displaced 
or not, many highly educated youth find 
themselves in a situation of recurring 
short-term contracts and training, ongo-
ing job insecurity, lacking career opportu-
nities and thus perpetual existential inse-
curity (Standing). Quite fittingly, what is 
striking about Jordan is the coexistence of 
other young populations with starkly dif-
ferent socioeconomic profiles, yet equally 
prone to timepass. In a country where 
almost every fifth university graduate is 
unemployed (Middle East Monitor), the 
humanitarian sector has grown into one of 
the biggest employers for young locals – 
often retaining them on short-term con-
tracts for years. For the displaced and 
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locals alike, keeping oneself busy coin-
cides with forever delayed meaningful 
futures. Yet stark class differences make 
that young Jordanians and Syrians in 
Mafraq experience waiting in different 
ways: while the former can afford lives of 
leisure in shopping malls and coffeeshops, 
the latter are constantly on the move, 
struggling to get by on a combination of 
odd jobs and humanitarian assistance – 
frantic waiting instead of idleness.
Ultimately, while this article took a critical 
stance towards NGOs’ entanglement 
with neoliberal policies, it might be 
time for critics to go beyond denunciatory 
analyses (Ferguson, “The Uses of 
Neoliberalism”). Ferguson’s (Give a Man a 
Fish) most recent work is thus concerned 
with carving out pro-poor policies within 
neoliberal frameworks, taking as a starting 
point the encroachment of market-based 
economies in the Global South which has 
paradoxically been accompanied by an 
expansion of social assistance programs. 
As countries like South Africa have transi-
tioned from a situation of labor shortage 
to a massive labor surplus, this leaves 
huge populations, including HIV orphans 
and widows, but also young men fit to 
work, without realistic opportunities for 
integrating into the labor market. Ferguson 
thus investigates the mobilizing potential 
of basic income grants for these popula-
tions. The caveat of this approach is that it 
is coupled to citizenship; yet these social 
experiments cannot fail to remind us of 
the situation of hundreds of thousands of 
Syrian refugees in Jordan surviving on a 
combination of humanitarian assistance 
and irregular work in the informal econ-
omy. Amidst the extension of work permits 
in low-skilled sectors to Syrian refugees in 
Jordan (ILO), there are currently (summer 
2017) rumors about a downscaling of the 
UNHCR cash assistance program, follow-
ing significant funding cuts in the WFP’s 
food voucher scheme in 2014 (Achilli). 
While there is no denying the benefits of 
granting Syrian refugees access to educa-
tion and formalizing Syrian labor, which 
shields refugees from legal insecurity and 
exploitative working conditions, access to 
the formal labor market accompanied by 
decreased protection seems an unrealistic 
scenario in a country characterized by a 
largely informalized economy and wide-
spread graduate unemployment. Hence, 
we might grudgingly have to accept that 
in the foreseeable future, handing out 
cash to most of the displaced might be the 
only way to help Syrian refugees to stay 
afloat.
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